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IF WE HAVE AN IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION, 
SHOULD WE SETTLE FOR REMARKABLY 
TIMID REFORM?  REFLECTIONS GENERATED 
BY THE GENERAL PHENOMENON OF ―TEA 
PARTY CONSTITUTIONALISM‖ AND RANDY 
BARNETT’S PARTICULAR PROPOSAL FOR A 
―REPEAL AMENDMENT‖ DESIGNED TO REIN 
IN AN OVERREACHING CONGRESS 
Sanford Levinson  
There is, of course, no single template for ―Tea Party Constitutional-
ism,‖ given that it is a large, somewhat inchoate movement that inevitably 
contains different, often conflicting, strains.  As someone from Texas, I am 
tempted to focus on some of the more extreme ideas associated with various 
politicians wishing to take advantage of the anger projected by many Tea 
Partiers toward the national government.  Thus at least two candidates for 
the 2010 Republican nomination for the Texas governorship (including the 
ultimately successful incumbent, Rick Perry) endorsed or at least flirted 
with nineteenth century ideas of ―nullification‖ and even secession as a po-
tential response to what is perceived as an overreaching national govern-
ment.1  More striking, presumably, was the proclamation by the 
(unsuccessful) Republican candidate for the Senate from Nevada, Sharron 
Angle: ―Our Founding Fathers, they put that Second Amendment in [the 
Constitution] for a good reason, and that was for the people to protect them-
selves against a tyrannical government . . . .  In fact, Thomas Jefferson said 
it’s good for a country to have a revolution every 20 years.  I hope that’s not 
where we’re going, but you know, if this Congress keeps going the way it 




  W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, University of Texas 
Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin (link).  This is a version of re-
marks initially presented at a panel on ―Tea Party Constitutionalism‖ organized by Professor Richard 
Albert for the 2011 meetings of the AALS in San Francisco.  It was an excellent panel, and I regret only 
that it was held at the Hilton Hotel. 
1
  See Sanford Levinson, Commentary: States Can’t Nullify Federal Law, AUSTIN AMERICAN–
STATESMAN, Feb. 7, 2010, http://www.statesman.com/opinion/insight/commentary-states-can-t-nullify-
federal-law-217250.html (link). 
2
  Anjeanette Damon & David McGrath Schwartz, Nev. Senate Hopeful Sharron Angle Talks of 
Armed Revolt, SCRIPPSNEWS, June 17, 2010, http://www.scrippsnews.com/content/nev-senate-hopeful-
sharron-angle-talks-armed-revolt (internal quotation marks omitted) (link). 
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But, to paraphrase former President Richard M. Nixon, it ―would be 
wrong‖ to dwell on such almost-certainly unrepresentative, albeit promi-
nent, public figures who have avidly promoted and embraced the ―Tea Party 
moment‖ of our contemporary polity. 
I have no doubt that my good friend Randy Barnett3 is far more typical 
of the median Tea Party constitutionalist, even if he is (somewhat) less 
prominent than, say, Ms. Angle or Governor Rick Perry.  So I hope it suf-
fices, for purposes of these comments, to focus on his own particular sup-
port for what he calls ―the Repeal Amendment,‖ which he believes would 
offer a temperate path toward reining in the possibly overweening national 
government.  The proposal would allow the legislatures of two-thirds of all 
states to repeal any congressional legislation.4  The New York Times accu-
rately quoted me as describing this proposal as ―a really terrible idea.‖5  I 
want to take this opportunity to elaborate why I consider this to be the case, 
though, paradoxically or not, I also think that the proposal is also remarka-
bly timid, in some ways not worth getting excited about.  This is because it 
is so spectacularly unlikely to be truly efficacious in achieving the goals 
Professor Barnett is striving for, namely returning our polity to a presumed 
―good old days‖ when the national government was far more limited in its 
conception of what it could do.  Those who share Professor Barnett’s basic 
fears about the national government ought to be far more concerned about 
his proposal than political liberals like myself, at least if one shifts from ab-
stract arguments of constitutional and political theory to predictions about 
practical importance and impact of his proposal. 
The proposal, whatever one thinks of its merits, captures a certain pa-
radox presented by ―Tea Party Constitutionalism.‖  On the one hand, at 
least some Tea Partiers adopt a stance of lamentable ―devotionalism‖ vis-à-
vis the Constitution, which leads to the suggestion that the original Consti-
tution, at least correctly understood, was almost ―inerrant,‖ to adopt a term 
from Protestant fundamentalism.6  This doesn’t prevent calling for amend-





  For the record, this is not simply an illustration of what might be termed ―senatorial courtesy,‖ 
where the convention is that people who despise each other regularly adopt such nomenclature.  Randy 
and I have been genuinely good friends for well over a decade.  I admire him and his work greatly, even 
if, as illustrated in these remarks, I believe that some of his particular ideas are questionable and even 
―terrible.‖ 
4
  Randy E. Barnett & William J. Howell, The Case for a “Repeal Amendment” WALL ST. J., Sept. 
16, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703466704575489572655964574.html 
(link). 
5
  Kate Zernike, Proposed Amendment Would Enable States to Repeal Federal Law, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/20/us/politics/20states.html (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (link). 
6
  See, e.g., Samuel G. Freedman, Tea Party Rooted in Religious Fervor for Constitution, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/06/us/politics/06religion.html (link). 
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would simply serve to return the Constitution to its original, pristine com-
mand that senators be selected by state legislatures.   
On the other hand, some Tea Partiers want genuinely to reform the 
Constitution in light of contemporary realities, as has been true of many 
earlier important political movements.  Professor Barnett is admirably dis-
inclined to view the original Constitution as perfect and supports, for exam-
ple, the Fourteenth Amendment, with its significant transfer of power to the 
national government and away from states with regard to guaranteeing 
rights.  I strongly suspect that he supports as well the Fifteenth and Nine-
teenth Amendments, however shocking each might have been to eighteenth 
century sensibilities.  Similarly, even the supporters of the Repeal Amend-
ment would scarcely argue that it is returning us to the 1787 Constitution; 
rather, it is desirable in order to provide a new kind of check on a strong na-
tional government that was almost certainly not envisioned by the Framers.  
A de facto ―living Constitution‖ requires what might be called ―living 
amendments‖ designed to respond to contemporary realities. 
These strains were well revealed in the now notorious fact that the 
House Republicans who insisted on reading the Constitution aloud—
coincidentally, on the very day the AALS panel that generated these com-
ments was being held in San Francisco—were willing to read only a bow-
dlerized version of the Constitution, one that omitted any reference, albeit 
indirect, to the shameful compromises over slavery that in fact made the 
Constitution possible.7  It was almost as if they were endorsing William 
Lloyd Garrison’s famous description of the 1787 Constitution as a ―cove-
nant with death, and an agreement with hell‖8 requiring repudiation or, at 
the very least, abject denial if Americans are to be expected, in the twenty-
first century, to have the requisite devotion to the Constitution.  One might 
defend what I was tempted to describe as the Orwellian suppression of our 
national past on the grounds that one should be expected to read only the 
Constitution that is operative today and not the Constitution that structured 
our politics in say, 1850, when the Three-Fifths Compromise gave extra re-
presentation to slave states in the House of Representatives and the Elector-
al College.9  There might be something to be said for this argument, but one 
should recognize that it ―works‖ if and only if one accepts the premise that 
the earlier Constitution was in fact grievously flawed and that the present 





  Jennifer Steinhauer, Constitution Has Its Day (More or Less) in House, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/us/politics/07constitution.html (link). 
8
  J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1703, 
1708 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (link). 
9
  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, superseded by U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 2 (stating that slaves 
would count as three-fifths of a person in determining House representative apportionment among the 
states) (link); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (stating that the number of state electors for each state is de-
termined by the sum of that state’s representatives and senators) (link). 
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Although Professor Barnett views his Repeal Amendment as a way of 
returning to the original expectations regarding the relative powers of na-
tional and state governments, it is glaringly obvious that the Framers never 
envisioned the particular mechanism that he advocates.  Perhaps that is be-
cause they expected a Senate composed of de facto ambassadors from the 
state legislatures (though, of course, without the ability of the legislature to 
recall senators who strayed from the legislature’s wishes) adequately to veto 
measures that invaded state prerogatives (in addition to whatever expecta-
tion some might have had that judicial review would also enforce the feder-
al bargain when the national government overreached).  Both hopes have 
proved chimerical.  The first, of course, is no longer even thinkable, given 
the Seventeenth Amendment; the Supreme Court, with some exceptions, 
has proved far more a faithful ally of nationalization than of protecting state 
prerogatives.10  In implicit response to these realities, then, he would allow 
two-thirds of the states to repeal—or, perhaps more accurately, ―sus-
pend‖—any and all federal legislation that the state legislators view as ma-
nifesting congressional overreach of its enumerated powers.  The states’ 
veto is ―suspensive‖ rather than conclusive because, he suggests, Congress 
could override the veto simply by re-passing the legislation in question, the-
reby risking whatever political retribution might be attached to ignoring the 
wishes of the complaining states. 
Why is this a ―truly terrible idea‖?  The answer is really quite simple: 
Professor Barnett’s desire to place a veto power in the hands of a two-thirds 
majority of the states further reinforces the already indefensible power as-
signed to small states in what I have called Our Undemocratic Constitu-
tion.11  That is, the thirty-four smallest-population states (according to the 
new 2010 census) constitute approximately 32% of the national popula-
tion.12  Thus, Professor Barnett would give state legislatures representing 





  For starters, see simply McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (link) and Gibbons v. Ogden, 
22 U.S. 1 (1824) (link), two seminal Marshall Court decisions that put the states in their place, so to 
speak, with regard to the ability to tax or to regulate commerce, not to mention an expansive view of na-
tional powers.  Or, for that matter, see Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842) (preventing states 
from enforcing their ―personal liberty laws‖ to provide semblance of due process to alleged fugitive 
slaves) (link).  See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (link); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 
(1964) (link); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (link).  There are, to be sure, some excep-
tions.  See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (link).  But, overall, the 
Supreme Court has proved a relatively ―hollow hope‖ with regard to guarding state prerogatives against 
national majorities.  See generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN 
ELITE 1789–2008 (2009); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000). 
11
  See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION 
GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT)  (2006). 
12
  According to the 2010 Census Apportionment Data, the fifty states have a combined population 
of 309,183,463, and the 34 smallest states have a combined population of 98,805,943, or 31.96%.  U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, APPORTIONMENT POPULATION AND NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES BY STATE: 2010 
CENSUS tbl.1, http://2010.census.gov/news/xls/apport2010_table1.xls (link). 
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often outright to kill) any and all federal legislation.  Professor Barnett’s re-
sponse to this point is simply to maintain, perhaps plausibly, that as an em-
pirical matter it is unlikely in the extreme that, say, Vermont and Delaware 
will ally with Idaho and Wyoming in a revolt against some exercise of na-
tional power.  Thus, he asserts, it is highly likely that any grouping of two-
thirds of the states would include one or more large states like Texas or 
Florida, and thus would encompass more than 50% of the national popula-
tion. 
Perhaps he is right, but what truly mystifies me is why he won’t accept 
an amendment to his own proposal that would require that the states claim-
ing such a veto power indeed represent at least half the national population.  
If the veto passes that crucial test, why should we care if the objectors com-
prise of less than two-thirds of the states?  What is so important about 
―stateness‖ that it trumps the actuality of ―we the American people‖?  Per-
haps Professor Barnett would reply that Madison and Jefferson were right 
in 1798—and secessionists thereafter?—that the Constitution was created 
by a compact among the states who retain their ―sovereignty‖ within the 
confederal political order.13  But, obviously, that raises questions that go 
beyond a fear that the national government has overstepped its limited 
mandate of only assigned powers. 
He insists that his current proposal won’t really make a difference with 
regard to imposing de facto minority rule on the majority of Americans.  
But I would really be quite horrified in the case, however unlikely, that it 
did make a difference, so that the national majority could find itself sty-
mied—at least for a period long enough for Congress to re-pass the offen-
sive legislation, as is allowed by his proposal—by a minority of its fellow 
citizens.  James Madison believed that treating all states equally, as in the 
allocation of voting power in the Senate, was an ―evil‖ worth accepting in 
order to get the Constitution at all.14  Why in the world would one want to 
recapitulate this evil when there is no such present necessity to submit to 
the extortionate demands of small states lest they torpedo the entire consti-
tutional project?  The added power given to small states is patently inde-
fensible in the twenty-first century, where the United States at least purports 
to be guided by ―democratic‖ values, perhaps the most basic of which is 
majority rule.15  We are probably stuck with the United States Senate, but 
there is no excuse at all to model any contemporary proposals after that 
egregious institution. 
To be sure, we do limit majority rule by protecting certain ―fundamen-
tal rights‖ or safeguarding vulnerable minorities from invidiously discrimi-





  For the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, written, respectively, by Jefferson and Madison, see 
ANTHONY J. BELLIA, JR., FEDERALISM 47–57 (2011); THE AVALON PROJECT, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/alsedact.asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2011) (link). 
14
  THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison) (link). 
15
  See, e.g., Sims, 377 U.S. at 566 (link). 
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all on what constitutes a ―fundamental right‖ against state or national legis-
lation per se.16  At the very least, Professor Barnett appears altogether un-
willing to rely on the Supreme Court to enunciate such boundary conditions 
on national power.  Still, he plays one of the rhetorical cards in the standard 
tropes of American politics: the necessity to protect minorities against ―ty-
ranny of the majority.‖17 
The obvious question, though, is how one defines the minorities that 
deserve such protection.  Any system built on majority rule inevitably 
creates unhappy losing minorities, and the great riddle of constitutional 
theory is figuring out exactly when, and why, courts should intervene 
against the vagaries of the ordinary political process.  Why would anyone, 
for example, believe that one should be so concerned with protecting the 
political interests—one can scarcely call them ―rights‖—of residents of 
small states that those residents should be given a truly extraordinary degree 
of protection unavailable to the benighted residents of large states such as 
California, Texas, Florida, or New York—who, of course, are grotesquely 
underrepresented in the United States Senate?  Is Professor Barnett a closet 
Jeffersonian who believes that there is some virtue in living in small, rural 
states, and that states like Illinois (from which he comes) or cities like 
Washington, D.C. (where he now lives) are simply repositories of deca-
dence and political evil? 
If he agrees with that argument made by Jefferson—and there is little 
or no evidence that he does—then there is no evidence that he shares anoth-
er important idea associated with Jefferson, which is the importance of de-
mocracy as popular rule.  And here is where the essential timidity and near-
irrelevance of the Barnett proposal is most striking.  One can only wonder if 
Tea Partiers will be assuaged by such truly small beer, though the opposi-
tion of liberals like myself may lead them to believe, falsely, that they will 
score a mighty victory should the Repeal Amendment be adopted.  After 





  For starters, simply think of the sequence of decisions, beginning with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
U.S. 186 (1986) (link), dealing with issues involving the rights of gays and lesbians; the continuing juri-
sprudential and political turmoil generated by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and its aftermath; and 
the incoherence of the two cases involving ―affirmative action‖ at the University of Michigan and its 
Law School, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (link) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 
(2003) (link), where the only thing one can say with confidence is that seven of the nine justices be-
lieved that it made no sense to uphold one and strike down the other, but, of course, they split 4-3 on 
what would be a constitutionally permissible ―consistent‖ result.  Gratz, 539 U.S. at 247 (plurality split 
into seven overlapping opinions with, inter alia, Justice O’Connor and Justice Breyer holding that the 
school’s policy should be struck down) and Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310 (plurality split into six overlapping 
opinions with, inter alia, Justice O’Connor and Justice Breyer holding that the school’s policy should be 
upheld).  And, perhaps especially relevant to the topic of federalism, the Court is bitterly divided with 
regard to protecting states against being sued in federal courts.  See, for example, Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (link) and successor cases. 
17
  See Randy E. Barnett, The Tea Party, the Constitution, and the Repeal Amendment, 105 NW. U. 
L. REV. COLLOQUY (forthcoming 2011). 
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lished by the Repeal Amendment, they would have to get the support of a 
minimum of sixty-seven state legislative houses in thirty-four states (sixty-
eight if one of the dissenting states is not Nebraska, the nation’s lone un-
icameral state18).  At least in theory, one could imagine the twenty-six larg-
est states, with approximately two-thirds of the national population, rising 
in protest against the rent-seeking agricultural legislation that owes its life 
to the indefensibly apportioned Senate.  But under the Barnett model, the 
will of two-thirds of our population would fall well short of accomplishing 
what less than one-third of our population could do with ease, given that 
those people lived in what would effectively be the ―more politically po-
tent‖ small states.  Should this really satisfy a populist movement that views 
itself as engaged in an insurgency against a near-illegitimate national gov-
ernment? 
Consider a far more democratic alternative, which is to adopt a leaf 
from, say, the Maine Constitution.  Section 17 of Article IV, dealing with 
the legislative power, provides as follows: 
 
SECTION 17. PROCEEDINGS FOR PEOPLE’S VETO. 
 1. PETITION PROCEDURE; PETITION FOR PEOPLE’S 
VETO. Upon written petition of electors, the number of 
which shall not be less than 10% of the total vote for Gov-
ernor cast in the last gubernatorial election preceding the 
filing of such petition, and addressed to the Governor and 
filed in the office of the Secretary of State by the hour of 
5:00 p.m., on or before the 90th day after the recess of the 
Legislature, or if such 90th day is a Saturday, a Sunday, or 
a legal holiday, by the hour of 5:00 p.m., on the preceding 
day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, 
requesting that one or more Acts, bills, resolves or resolu-
tions, or part or parts thereof, passed by the Legislature but 
not then in effect by reason of the provisions of the preced-
ing section, be referred to the people, [and] such Acts, bills, 
resolves, or resolutions or part or parts thereof as are spe-
cified in such petition shall not take effect until 30 days af-
ter the Governor shall have announced by public 
proclamation that the same have been ratified by a majori-
ty of the electors voting thereon at a statewide or general 
election. 
2. EFFECT OF REFERENDUM. The effect of any Act, bill, 
resolve or resolution or part or parts thereof as are specified 
in such petition shall be suspended upon the filing of such 





  History of the Nebraska Unicameral, NEBRASKA LEGISLATURE, 
http://nebraskalegislature.gov/about/history_unicameral.php (last visited Feb. 26, 2011) (link). 
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any procedure enacted by the Legislature pursuant to the 
Constitution, that such petition was invalid, such Act, bill, 
resolve or resolution or part or parts thereof shall then take 
effect upon the day following such final determination.19 
 
I select Maine precisely because one does not ordinarily associate 
Maine with California, which for many has become a symbol of populist 
democracy run riot.  Like Switzerland, it is, for most of us, a model of so-
briety and ―Down-East‖ common sense.20  Not all referenda have had happy 
consequences, of course, but that comes along with any constitutional pro-
cedure.  There are no perfect constitutions.  But one can (and must) always 
choose between more (or less) democratic forms of rule.  Ninety-eight per-
cent of the American state constitutions (fourty-nine of the fifty—Delaware 
is the exception) contain provisions for some form of direct democracy.21  
One might think that someone interested in fettering the national govern-
ment might find a procedure like Maine’s appealing.  But apparently Pro-
fessor Barnett does not, in part because it is clear that democracy per se is 
not particularly important to him. 
In that, he mimics most of the Framers in Philadelphia.  Alexander 
Hamilton probably spoke for many of his fellow delegates in Philadelphia 
when he stated, on June 18, 1787, that: 
 
All communities divide themselves into the few and the 
many.  The first are the rich and well born, the other the 
mass of the people. . . .  The people are turbulent and 
changing; they seldom judge or determine right.  Give 
therefore to the first class a distinct, permanent share in the 
government.22 
 
It is almost certainly unfair to attribute Hamilton’s liking for rule by 
―the rich and well born‖ to Professor Barnett, but it is clear that he has no 
desire for rule by ―the mass of the people,‖ as recognized by Maine’s provi-
sion or, for that matter, Lincoln’s famous encomium to government ―by the 
people‖ as well as ―of‖ and ―for‖ the people, the latter two of which require 





  ME. CONST. art. IV, § 17, available at http://www.maine.gov/legis/const/ (emphasis added) 
(link). 
20
  I pick Switzerland, of course, because it probably relies on referenda for governance more than 
any other country.  See REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD: THE GROWING USE OF DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY 5 tbl.1-1 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1994) (link). 
21
  K.K. DuVivier, Out of the Bottle: The Genie of Direct Democracy, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1045, 1046 
(2007) (link). 
22
  1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 299 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) 
(link). 
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I personally find this to be one of the most interesting tensions within 
the thought of Tea Partiers and those broadly sympathetic to them, like 
Randy Barnett.  Tea Partiers seem predominantly23 to be populist, contemp-
tuous of political elites, including ―experts‖ who proclaim the possession of 
relevant knowledge and understanding that are not readily available to those 
who lack specialized training.  Instead, they speak in the name of ―We the 
People‖ and the concomitant ability of ordinary Americans to make deci-
sions on matters that affect their lives.24  But they also proclaim their vene-
ration of the 1787 Constitution, which is about as un-populist as one can 
imagine within the framework of a ―republican form of government.‖  If, 
though, one truly agrees with Professor Barnett’s arguments about the evils 
connected with a strong national government, then why should we stop with 
his almost painfully inefficacious Repeal Amendment?  Why shouldn’t we 
go on to embrace the wisdom of the Down Easters of Maine?  Is it suffi-
cient to say, altogether accurately, that it would have appalled almost all of 
those who were present in Philadelphia and who supported the new Consti-
tution?  Many of them, of course, would have been equally appalled by the 
demise of slavery.  So what? 
Even though I most definitely do not agree with Professor Barnett’s 
general views of national power and the need to reinvigorate the states, I 
confess that I’m not sure where I would stand if his proposal were similar to 
the Maine procedure.  It is obvious that much legislation gets through Con-
gress, especially as part of ―omnibus legislation,‖ without sufficient atten-
tion or public support.  Would it be the end of the world if there were in fact 
a mechanism by which the majority of Americans, voting as part of a single 
electorate in which each vote would indeed be equal in weight to all others, 
could express their views on such legislation?  I doubt it, and I can even 
imagine concluding that the world, or at least that part that contains the 
United States, would be better off. 
At its best, ―Tea Party Constitutionalism,‖ especially the wing attracted 





  This is based on observing contemporary American politics rather than any significant methodo-
logically sophisticated analysis of the deep ideology of the Tea Party movement, which still seems to be 
lacking at this time (early 2011). 
24
  Readers of a certain age might recognize overtones of the 1960s ―new left‖ and its call for ―parti-
cipatory democracy‖ based precisely on the premise that people had the right and ability to make deci-
sions on matters that affected their own lives.  See, e.g., The Port Huron Statement of the Students for a 
Democratic Society, 1962, http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/huron.html (―As a social 
system we seek the establishment of a democracy of individual participation, governed by two central 
aims: that the individual share in those social decisions determining the quality and direction of his life; 
that society be organized to encourage independence in men and provide the media for their common 
participation.‖) (link). 
Perhaps it is appropriate to add as well Marx’s great reminder that historical events often take place 
―the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.‖  Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bo-
naparte (1852), http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm (link). 
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overdue national conversation about the efficacy of our eighteenth century 
Constitution, as amended, in our own time.  The proposal by many Tea Par-
tiers to repeal the Seventeenth Amendment, which moved the selection of 
senators from state legislatures to the general electorate, also invites a basic 
discussion about the degree to which we really wish to endorse a ―strong‖ 
form of federalism, defined as the systematic protection of the institutional 
autonomy of states with regard to important policy domains.  No serious 
person could possibly believe that the modern Senate has much, if anything, 
to do with federalism per se.  One might believe that returning to selection 
by state legislatures would enhance ―constitutional federalism,‖ though this 
would probably be even more likely if the United States were to emulate 
Germany, where the Bundesrat is composed entirely of political leaders and 
officials drawn from the various German Länder.25 
For many of us, the Tea Party is the equivalent of a very sour lemon.  
But we should also remember the old adage that if one has a lemon, then 
the task is to make lemonade.  For me, such lemonade would be a civil na-
tional conversation, like the one in San Francisco, about basic visions of the 
American political order in the twenty-first century and what kinds of polit-
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